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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to decide how bankruptcy 
courts should value collateral retained by a Chapter 11 debtor 
in order to determine the amount of a creditor‟s secured claim 
under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).  Appellants, a group of creditors 
known as the Cornerstone Investors, claim that the 
Bankruptcy Court erred by valuing their secured claims at 
zero based on an appraisal of Debtors‟ real estate offered by 
the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.  We conclude 
that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in its valuation of the 
real estate, and that it properly determined that the 
Cornerstone Investors held only unsecured claims.  In so 
concluding, we also clarify the burden of proof with respect 
to such valuations in the § 506(a) context. 
I.  Background 
 Debtors Heritage Highgate, Inc. and Heritage-Twin 
Ponds II, L.P. embarked upon the development of a 
residential subdivision in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania (the 
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“Project”) in August 2005.  The Project was to consist of 
townhouses and single-family detached homes. 
 Debtors entered into a series of construction loan 
agreements, first borrowing from a group of banks led by 
Wachovia (the “Bank Lenders”).  Pursuant to their 
agreement, the Bank Lenders retained a lien on substantially 
all of Debtors‟ assets as collateral for the loan.  Debtors 
subsequently borrowed from several individuals and entities, 
known collectively as the Cornerstone Investors.  Pursuant to 
those agreements, the Cornerstone Investors similarly 
received liens, of equal priority with the Bank Lenders and 
each other, on substantially all of Debtors‟ assets.  The 
Cornerstone Investors, however, later agreed to subordinate 
their secured claims to the secured claim of the Bank Lenders 
in a set of intercreditor agreements.  
 On January 20, 2009, after building and selling 
approximately a quarter of the planned units, Debtors filed 
voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  On June 9, 2009, Debtors filed a joint 
proposed plan of reorganization, which provided that they 
would complete development of the subdivision and make 
distributions to their creditors according to a set of 
projections.  In the initial proposed plan, Debtors projected 
that they would first pay the secured claim of the Bank 
Lenders in full, then pay the secured claims of the 
Cornerstone Investors in full, and thereafter pay all unsecured 
claims at a rate of approximately 20% each, from the funds 
earned through lot sales. 
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 In connection with a contested cash collateral hearing,
1
 
Debtors offered an appraisal of the Project prepared by an 
experienced real estate appraisal company, Reaves C. Lukens, 
in February 2009 to demonstrate the worth of their collateral.  
The 140-page appraisal set forth in detail the company‟s 
estimation of the real estate development‟s fair market value 
pursuant to two well-accepted appraisal methodologies, the 
sales comparison approach and the income capitalization 
approach.
2
  According to the appraiser, both analyses “were 
                                                        
 
1
Cash collateral includes “cash, negotiable 
instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, 
or other cash equivalents . . . in which the estate and any 
entity other than the estate have an interest and includes the 
proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property.”  
11 U.S.C. § 363(a).  To continue using the cash collateral of a 
secured lender, a Chapter 11 debtor must either obtain 
consent from the secured lender or obtain the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s authorization.  Id. § 363(c)(2).  In the event a secured 
creditor does not consent and the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
authorization is sought in a contested hearing, the Chapter 11 
debtor must demonstrate that the secured creditor is 
adequately protected.  Id. § 363(e), (p).  Forms of adequate 
protection are set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 361, and include other 
collateral that has value in excess of the secured creditor‟s 
claim or a budget that provides for the continued operation of 
the debtor‟s  business without detriment to the secured 
lender‟s position. 
  
 2The sales comparison approach and income 
capitalization approach are two techniques frequently used by 
appraisers in arriving at the fair market value of land.  See In 
re Tamarack Trail Co., 23 B.R. 3, 5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) 
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well supported by market evidence” and yielded virtually 
identical estimations.  The appraiser favored the results of the 
latter because it “more accurately considered the time and 
expenses” related to a real estate development like the 
Project.  The Bankruptcy Court accepted the appraiser‟s 
calculation of the Project‟s fair market value as 
approximately $15 million, which was then sufficient to cover 
the entirety of the secured debt.    
 On September 4, 2009, the Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) filed a motion to 
value the secured claims of the Cornerstone Investors 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 3012.  The Committee claimed that the 
Bankruptcy Court should value the secured claims at zero 
because the collateral securing the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
liens, the Project, was worth less than the Bank Lenders‟ 
senior secured claim.  As proof of the collateral‟s worth, the 
Committee submitted the February 2009 appraisal previously 
accepted by the Bankruptcy Court as evidence of the Project‟s 
fair market value at the contested cash collateral hearing.  
However, when reduced by interim sales, the fair market 
                                                                                                                            
(noting that there are “three appraisal techniques . . . available 
to appraisers,” two of which are the sales comparison and 
income capitalization approaches).  The sales comparison 
approach is a method of analyzing sales of similar recently 
sold parcels to arrive at a probable sale price for the property 
being appraised. The income capitalization approach is a 
method in which the appraiser estimates the value of land 
based upon the present value of the income stream to be 
generated by the sale of the individual lots within the 
development over an estimated holding period. 
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value was approximately $9.54 million.
3
  The Committee 
urged that, because this amount was insufficient to pay the 
Bank Lenders in full, the secured claims of the Cornerstone 
Investors were valueless.  In response, the Cornerstone 
Investors argued that their claims should be deemed wholly 
secured because projections that accompanied the plan filed 
by Debtors estimated that Debtors would derive revenue from 
the Project sufficient to pay their claims in full.  The parties 
agreed to postpone consideration of the motion until after 
confirmation of the reorganization plan. 
 On March 2, 2010, Debtors submitted their final plan 
of reorganization.  The plan specified that claims of the 
Cornerstone Investors would be secured to the extent 
determined by the Bankruptcy Court in ruling on the 
Committee‟s motion.  The final plan included a projected 
budget that anticipated full payment of both the Bank 
Lenders‟ senior secured debt and the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
junior secured debt through the development and sale of lots 
with completed townhouses and single-family homes over the 
course of 47 months.  According to the budget, unsecured 
claimants would receive distributions amounting to 
approximately 45% of their claims.  No interested party, 
including the Cornerstone Investors, objected to Debtors‟ 
final plan of reorganization.  On April 1, 2010, the 
Bankruptcy Court entered an order confirming the plan.  The 
Bankruptcy Court concluded, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(11), that the plan was feasible, i.e., that further 
                                                        
 
3
Sales following the appraisal generated approximately 
$5.45 million in proceeds, which were used to fund 
operations, including payment of some principal and interest 
to the Bank Lenders. 
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liquidation or reorganization beyond the plan‟s provisions 
would be unlikely.      
 With the plan confirmed, the Bankruptcy Court took 
up the Committee‟s motion to value the Cornerstone 
Investors‟ secured claims.  On April 14, 2010, the parties 
filed joint stipulations of fact to assist the Bankruptcy Court 
in ruling on the motion.  They agreed that the Bank Lenders 
were then owed approximately $12 million, while the 
Cornerstone Investors were owed approximately $1.4 million.  
Debtors and the Cornerstone Investors stipulated that the 
appraised value of the Project should be reduced due to 
Debtors‟ sale of lots since the appraisal‟s completion on 
February 21, 2009, and that, “[b]ased on the Appraisal, the 
total fair market value of the Project as of the Confirmation 
Date [wa]s $9,543,396.23.”  Additional assets held by 
Debtors raised the total value of the collateral securing liens 
to $11,165,477.15. 
 On May 3, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing 
on the Committee‟s motion.  At the hearing, the Committee 
reiterated its argument that the appraisal, as adjusted, 
reflected the worth of the Project in accordance with § 506(a) 
— namely, its fair market value as of confirmation.  The 
appraisal, argued the Committee, demonstrated that the fair 
market value was less than the Bank Lenders‟ secured claim, 
such that no value remained to secure the Cornerstone 
Investors‟ liens.  While they agreed that the appraisal 
depicted the Project‟s fair market value, the Cornerstone 
Investors contended that it did not control because § 506(a) 
requires that the value of property “be determined in light of 
[its] proposed disposition or use” and the plan budget 
demonstrated that the Debtors would be able to pay their 
claims in full over time as more homes were sold.  They also 
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urged the court to adjudge their claims fully secured, arguing 
that to deprive them of Project revenue to be generated over 
and above the appraisal value would constitute impermissible 
lien stripping.     
 The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Committee.  It 
determined that the proper method of valuing the Cornerstone 
Investors‟ secured claims was the fair market value of the 
Project as of the plan‟s confirmation date.  The Cornerstone 
Investors did not dispute the accuracy of the fair market value 
set forth in the appraisal, choosing instead to rely upon the 
plan budget.  The Bankruptcy Court accepted the appraisal as 
a proper basis for the valuation.  Because the amount 
remaining due on Debtors‟ obligation to the Bank Lenders 
exceeded the sum of the Project‟s fair market value and the 
value of other assets held by Debtors, no collateral remained 
to secure the Cornerstone Investors‟ claims.  Therefore, the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled, the Cornerstone Investors would be 
treated as unsecured creditors.   
 The Cornerstone Investors appealed the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s ruling to the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
ruling.  Relying upon the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997), it 
considered the Project‟s fair market value controlling and 
found the appraisal to have accurately measured that value.  
The District Court rejected the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
suggestion that the plan budget constituted the appropriate 
basis for valuing their secured claims because they knew that 
the amount of their secured claims would be determined 
pursuant to the Committee‟s motion, as the plan specifically 
so stated.  The plan budget, the District Court stated, merely 
constituted projections meant to demonstrate the plan‟s 
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feasibility, not the Project‟s present value.  The District Court 
noted that, while the Supreme Court has prohibited lien 
stripping in liquidation cases, see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 
410 (1992), nothing prohibited lien stripping in the 
reorganization context.   
 This timely appeal followed.  The Cornerstone 
Investors make two interrelated arguments, emphasizing 
throughout that § 506(a) requires that property be valued “in 
light of . . . [its] proposed disposition or use.”  First, the 
Cornerstone Investors contend that the Project‟s discounted 
present value, as reflected in the appraisal, cannot control the 
extent to which their claims are secured because the plan calls 
for Debtors to develop and sell homes in the subdivision over 
time.  The Bankruptcy Court, the argument proceeds, could 
only have valued the Project in a manner respectful of its 
“proposed disposition or use” by awaiting the results of the 
planned build-out.  Second, the Cornerstone Investors 
contend that, by pinning a value to the Project prior to the 
plan‟s completion in violation of § 506(a)‟s dictates, the 
Bankruptcy Court denied them revenue that would ultimately 
be realized from the Project in excess of its appraisal value.  
They urge that depriving them of any increase in the worth of 
their collateral beyond its judicially determined value violates 
restrictions on lien stripping imposed by the Supreme Court 
in Dewsnup.    
 After briefly turning to the burden of proof, we address 
each aspect of the Cornerstone Investors‟ argument in turn.   
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the instant 
dispute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334.  The District Court had 
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jurisdiction to review the final order of the Bankruptcy Court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 “Because the District Court sat as an appellate court, 
reviewing an order of the Bankruptcy Court, our review of the 
District Court‟s determinations is plenary.”  In re Rashid, 210 
F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 2000), superseded on other grounds as 
stated in In re Warfel, 268 B.R. 205, 212 n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2001).  In reviewing the Bankruptcy Court‟s determinations, 
we exercise the same standard of review as did the District 
Court.  Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter 
Techs., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995).  Accordingly, 
the Bankruptcy Court‟s findings of fact are reviewed only for 
clear error, while legal determinations are reviewed de novo.  
In re Engel, 124 F.3d 567, 571 (3d Cir. 1997).   
III.  Discussion 
A.  Burden-Shifting Framework 
 Neither the Code nor the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure allocates the burden of proof as to the value of 
secured claims under § 506(a).  In the absence of explicit 
direction, courts have arrived at divergent formulations.  
Although neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the District Court 
considered this issue, addressing it informs our review of the 
question on appeal and provides guidance to courts generally.  
Accordingly, we requested supplemental briefing on the 
issue.  We now hold that a burden-shifting framework 
controls valuations of collateral to decide the extent to which 
claims are secured pursuant to § 506(a).  
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 Three approaches to the burden of proof in 
proceedings to value secured claims under § 506(a) have 
predominated in bankruptcy cases.  Some courts have 
concluded that the secured creditor bears the burden of proof.  
See, e.g., In re Sneijder, 407 B.R. 46, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2009).  Other courts have held that the party challenging the 
value of a claim, usually the debtor, bears the burden of 
proof.  See, e.g., In re Weichey, 405 B.R. 158, 164 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 2009).  A third group of courts has settled on a 
burden-shifting analysis, pursuant to which “the debtor bears 
the initial burden of proof to overcome the presumed validity 
and amount of the creditor‟s secured claim,” but “the ultimate 
burden of persuasion is upon the creditor to demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence both the extent of its lien and 
the value of the collateral securing its claim.”  In re 
Robertson, 135 B.R. 350, 352 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).   
 “The circumstances will dictate the assignment of the 
burden of proof on the question of value.”  In re Young, 390 
B.R. 480, 486 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008).  Cognizant of this 
principle, a burden-shifting approach strikes us as most 
appropriate in the instant scenario.  The initial burden should 
be on the party challenging a secured claim‟s value, because 
“11 U.S.C. § 502(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f) grant prima 
facie effect to the validity and amount of a properly filed 
claim.”  In re Williams, 381 B.R. 742, 744 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 
2008).  It is only fair, then, that the party seeking to negate 
the presumptively valid amount of a secured claim — and 
thereby affect the rights of a creditor — bear the initial 
burden.  See In re Brown, 244 B.R. 603, 609-10 (Bankr. W.D. 
Va. 2000).  If the movant establishes with sufficient evidence 
that the proof of claim overvalues a creditor‟s secured claim 
because the collateral is of insufficient value, the burden 
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shifts.  The creditor thereafter bears “the ultimate burden of 
persuasion . . . to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence both the extent of its lien and the value of the 
collateral securing its claim.”4  In re Robertson, 135 B.R. at 
352. 
 Before applying the burden-shifting framework to this 
dispute, we must first grapple with the two more fundamental 
challenges raised by the Cornerstone Investors: that use of the 
collateral‟s fair market value violated § 506(a)‟s “proposed 
disposition or use” language; and, that the collateral‟s 
increase in value after the § 506(a) valuation rightly accrues 
to their benefit.  That is because, if either contention is 
correct, the appraisal would not have constituted a proper 
basis for the Bankruptcy Court‟s ruling.           
B.  Section 506(a) Valuation Standards 
 Central to resolution of this matter is the text of 
§ 506(a).  It provides in pertinent part: 
An allowed claim of a creditor 
secured by a lien on property in 
which the estate has an interest . . 
. is a secured claim to the extent 
of the value of such creditor‟s 
                                                        
 4Allocating the ultimate burden of persuasion to the 
creditor whose proof of claim has been challenged is 
consistent with the rest of the Code.  “Throughout the Code, 
the burden of proving the „validity, priority, and extent‟ of 
security interests lies upon the creditors asserting such 
interests.”  In re Buick, 126 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1991).   
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interest in the estate‟s interest in 
such property . . . and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that 
the value of such creditor‟s 
interest . . . is less than the amount 
of such allowed claim.  Such 
value shall be determined in light 
of the purpose of the valuation 
and of the proposed disposition or 
use of such property . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (emphasis added).  The provision, 
therefore, calls for the division of secured creditors‟ claims 
into “secured and unsecured portions, with the secured 
portion[s] of the claim[s] limited to the value of the 
collateral.”  Rash, 520 U.S. at 961.  
 Though the statute requires that collateral be valued, it 
does not specify the appropriate valuation standard.  See In re 
Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72, 73-74 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (“The statute does not direct courts to choose any 
particular valuation standard in a given type of case.”).  
According to a House Report on § 506(a), “„[v]alue‟ does not 
necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the 
collateral; nor does it imply a full going concern value.” See 
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6312.  Rather, Congress envisioned a 
flexible approach to valuation whereby bankruptcy courts 
would choose the standard that best fits the circumstances of 
a particular case.  Id. (“Courts will have to determine the 
value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of 
each case and the competing interests in the case.”).  
Congress did make at least one thing clear, though: “the 
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„proposed disposition or use‟ of the collateral is of paramount 
importance to the valuation question.”  Rash, 520 U.S. at 962.   
 If that language is to be afforded any significance, 
then, the appropriate standard for valuing collateral must 
depend upon what is to be done with the property — whether 
it is to be liquidated, surrendered, or retained by the debtor.  
In Rash, the Supreme Court considered how to value 
collateral retained by a Chapter 13 debtor exercising the cram 
down option in § 1325(a)(5)(B) of the Code.  The Court 
distinguished that option from the alternative available to the 
Chapter 13 debtor — in which its collateral would be 
surrendered to the objecting debtor — when deciding the 
proper valuation standard under § 506(a).
5
  See id. at 962 
(“The „disposition or use‟ of the collateral thus turns on the 
alternative the debtor chooses . . . .”).  When a debtor elects 
“to use the collateral to generate an income stream” as in a 
cram down, the Court noted, use of a foreclosure-value 
standard would be improper because “a foreclosure sale . . . 
will not take place.”  Id. at 963.  By contrast, the replacement-
value standard “values „the creditor‟s interest in the collateral 
in light of the proposed [repayment plan] reality: no 
foreclosure sale and economic benefit for the debtor derived 
from the collateral equal to . . . its [replacement] value.‟”  Id. 
(quoting In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d at 75) 
                                                        
 5The Court considered three possible valuation 
standards: “(1) what the secured creditor could obtain through 
foreclosure sale of the property (the „foreclosure-value‟ 
standard); (2) what the debtor would have to pay for 
comparable property (the „replacement-value‟ standard); or 
(3) the mid-point between these two measurements.”  Rash, 
520 U.S. at 955-56. 
16 
 
(alterations in original).  Accordingly, the Court held that 
“under § 506(a), the value of property retained . . . is the cost 
the debtor would incur to obtain a like asset for the same 
„proposed use,‟” i.e., its replacement value.6  Id. 
 Courts have recognized that similar reasoning applies 
with equal force in the Chapter 11 reorganization context.  
See, e.g., In re Mayslake Village-Plainfield Campus, Inc., 441 
B.R. 309, 320 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (“The same 
[replacement] value can be used in this matter, even though a 
Chapter 11 cram down plan is involved.”).   Where a Chapter 
11 plan of reorganization provides for a debtor to retain and 
use collateral to generate income with which to make 
payments to creditors, a § 506(a) valuation based upon a 
hypothetical foreclosure sale would not be appropriate, as it 
would be inconsistent with the provision‟s dictates.  “In 
ordinary circumstances the present value of the income 
stream would [instead] be equal to the collateral‟s fair market 
value.”  In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, 50 F.3d at 75.  
Indeed, the Rash Court considered its “use of the term 
replacement value . . . consistent with . . . the meaning of fair-
market value” because both reflect “the price a willing buyer 
in the debtor‟s trade, business, or situation would pay a 
willing seller to obtain property of like age and condition.”  
520 U.S. at 959 n.2.  The proper measure under § 506(a) must 
                                                        
 
6The Supreme Court expressly left “to bankruptcy 
courts, as triers of fact, identification of the best way of 
ascertaining replacement value on the basis of the evidence 
presented.”  Rash, 520 U.S. at 965 n.6.   
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therefore be the collateral‟s fair market value because it is 
most respectful of the property‟s anticipated use.7   
 By contrast, the Cornerstone Investors urge a market-
based, or wait-and-see, approach to valuation of the Project.  
They argue that if the property, when sold, will bring in 
sufficient dollars to pay their secured claims in full, their 
claims should reflect that value.  They suggest that, because 
Debtors will continue to develop and sell lots during the 
plan‟s life, the extent to which their claims are secured should 
similarly be calculated over time.  To our knowledge, 
however, under no circumstances has such an approach been 
used, even when the collateral at issue was of a similar nature.  
See, e.g., In re Tamarack Trail Co., 23 B.R. 3, 5-6 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1982) (valuing a partially completed development 
project based on the fair market value in its current 
condition).  Its absence is for good reason.  A wait-and-see 
approach would in effect do away with bankruptcy courts‟ 
obligation to determine value under § 506(a).
8
  That result is 
                                                        
 
7
 Like the appropriate measure of fair market value, the 
appropriate time as of which to value collateral may differ 
depending on the facts presented.  See King, 4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy ¶ 506.03[10] (15th ed. rev. 2009) (discussing the 
potentially relevant dates of valuation for purposes of 
§ 506(a)).  As with the replacement valuation technique, 
bankruptcy courts are best situated to determine when is the 
appropriate time to value collateral in the first instance.  We, 
therefore, defer to their considered judgment. 
 
 8Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3012 — 
pursuant to which the Committee made its motion — allows 
interested parties to request that a bankruptcy court value 
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at odds with the Bankruptcy Code.  In § 506(a), Congress 
expressly provided for the division of allowed claims 
supported by liens into secured and unsecured portions during 
the reorganization, before the plan‟s success or failure is 
clear.  The fact that its “proposed disposition or use” should 
be factored into the valuation does not mean that the time as 
of which property is valued is to be postponed or altered.  
 Both the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court 
accurately characterized the budget as simply a set of 
projections offered in support of the plan‟s feasibility, i.e., to 
demonstrate that the plan would have a “reasonable 
probability” of success.  See In re TCI 2 Holdings, LLC, 428 
B.R. 117, 148 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010) (“The key element of 
feasibility is whether there is a reasonable probability the 
provisions of the plan can be performed.”).  It was not 
intended to function as anything more, and most certainly not 
as a determination of the value of the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
interest in the Project.  This is clear from the fact that the plan 
expressly states that the amount of their secured claims will 
be determined by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to the 
Committee‟s motion.  More fundamentally, the projections 
regarding monies to be realized from the sale of lots over time 
do not equate to “value” as of confirmation because they 
anticipate Debtors spending time and money to realize value 
                                                                                                                            
claims and therefore necessarily requires that collateral‟s 
worth be affixed in advance of a reorganization‟s completion.  
Parties like the Committee would have very little, if any, 
reason to make such motions for valuations pursuant to Rule 
3012 if bankruptcy courts adopted the approach here urged by 
the Cornerstone Investors.  This is further reason to reject it 
as discordant with bankruptcy practice. 
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at a later date.  That future value should not be credited to the 
secured creditor at confirmation.  A “probability” of realizing 
the budget is not a certainty of its realization.  In sum, 
valuations must be based upon realistic measures of present 
worth. 
 Applying these precepts to the matter at hand, we hold 
that the Bankruptcy Court properly concluded that the fair 
market value of the Project as of the confirmation date 
controls whether the Cornerstone Investors‟ claims are 
secured or not.  That is because the confirmed plan of 
reorganization called for Debtors to retain ownership of the 
real estate subdivision in order to complete its development.  
The discounted fair market value of the property as of the 
confirmation date, therefore, best approximated just how 
secure the liens held by creditors — namely, the Bank 
Lenders and Cornerstone Investors — were at the relevant 
point in Debtors‟ bankruptcy.9  Because, as the Cornerstone 
                                                        
 
9
 “[T]he value of the property should be determined as 
of the date to which the valuation relates.”  In re Savannah 
Gardens-Oaktree, 146 B.R. 306, 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992).  
“Where, as here, the purpose of the valuation is to determine 
the treatment of a claim by a plan, the values determined at 
the § 506(a) hearing must be compatible with the values that 
will prevail on the confirmation date . . . .”  In re Stanley, 185 
B.R. 417, 423-24 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995).  We, therefore, 
agree with the Bankruptcy Court‟s determination that the 
appropriate time at which to assess the Project‟s fair market 
value in deciding the Committee‟s motion was on, or close to, 
the plan‟s confirmation date.  See, e.g., In re Melgar Enters., 
Inc., 151 B.R.  34, 39 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that a 
real estate project should be valued in its present state and “in 
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Investors stipulated, the appraisal accurately calculated the 
Project‟s fair market value, the Bankruptcy Court correctly 
concluded that claims of the Cornerstone Investors were 
wholly unsecured. 
C.  Lien Stripping in Chapter 11 Reorganizations 
 The Cornerstone Investors argue that denying them 
future lot sale proceeds that exceed the Project‟s judicially 
determined value as of confirmation constitutes a form of lien 
stripping disallowed by the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Dewsnup.  For the reasons set forth below, however, we reject 
this argument. 
 In Dewsnup, the Supreme Court considered “some 
ambiguities” in § 506 and its relationship to other provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code when a Chapter 7 debtor‟s property 
increases in value between the time of its judicial valuation 
and the time of its foreclosure sale.  502 U.S. at 416.  Guided 
by the principle that liens are to pass through bankruptcy 
unaffected, the Court rejected the notion that a mortgagee 
could be forced to accept the judicially determined value, 
even if the foreclosure sale produced more: 
The practical effect of petitioner‟s 
argument is to freeze the 
creditor‟s secured interest at the 
judicially determined valuation.  
By this approach, the creditor 
would lose the benefit of any 
increase in the value of the 
                                                                                                                            
close proximity to the effective date of the plan”).  No party 
has argued otherwise. 
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property by the time of the 
foreclosure sale.  The increase 
would accrue to the  benefit of the 
debtor, a result some of the parties 
describe as a “windfall.”   
We think, however, that the 
creditor‟s lien stays with the real 
property until the foreclosure.  
That is what was bargained for by 
the mortgagor and the mortgagee. 
Id. at 417.   Expressly limiting its focus to the specific facts 
presented, the Court held that “[a]ny increase over the 
judicially determined valuation during bankruptcy rightly 
accrues to the benefit of the creditor.”  Id. at 416-17. 
 Dewsnup involved a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding 
and the Supreme Court did not address whether the same 
result would be reached in Chapter 11 reorganization cases.  
See id.  “A great majority of courts that have considered the 
issue . . . have concluded that the holding in Dewsnup should 
be limited to Chapter 7 cases . . . .”  In re Johnson, 386 B.R. 
171, 175 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008).  That is because “[t]he 
rationales advanced in the Dewsnup opinion for prohibiting 
lien stripping . . . have little relevance in the context of 
rehabilitative bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter[] 11.”  
In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 291 n.21 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Particularly 
significant is the fact that, as hinted by the Dewsnup Court 
itself, “pre-Code law did provide for the modification of liens 
in reorganization cases.”  Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 
574, 582 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996).  “Congress must have enacted 
the Code with a full understanding of this practice.”  
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Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419.  The distinction makes sense: 
Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings involve the sale of liened 
property; Chapter 11 reorganizations involve the retention 
and use of that property in the rehabilitated debtor‟s business.  
The Code makes that clear: “the process of lien stripping is 
ingrained in the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code to such an extent that any attempt to extend the holding 
in Dewsnup to Chapter 11 cases would require that numerous 
provisions of the statute be ignored or construed in a very 
convoluted manner.”10 Johnson, 386 B.R. at 176; see also In 
re Dever, 164 B.R. 132, 133 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994).  
Indeed, Congress‟s post-Dewsnup addition of 11 U.S.C. § 
1123(b)(5) — permitting modification of the rights of holders 
of secured claims, except those secured solely by a debtor‟s 
                                                        
 10Two provisions in Chapter 11 demonstrate the 
complications inherent in the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
invocation of Dewsnup.  The first is § 1129(b), pursuant to 
which a Chapter 11 plan must provide for the retention of 
liens only up to the value of the secured creditor‟s collateral 
in order to satisfy the requirements of a cram down.  See In re 
680 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 156 B.R. 726, 731 n.7 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1993).  That the lien a plan must preserve need only 
collateralize a “secured claim,” as defined in § 506(a), is 
indicative of Chapter 11 debtors‟ ability to strip liens down to 
the collateral‟s value.  Id.  The second is § 1111(b), pursuant 
to which undersecured creditors may opt out of the lien 
stripping found in § 1129 and instead be treated as fully 
secured to the extent of their allowed claims.  That 
undersecured creditors have that option similarly suggests 
that Chapter 11 debtors possess the authority to limit secured 
claims to the value of the collateral.  See Wade v. Bradford, 
39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1994).   
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principal residence — seems to constitute explicit approval of 
lien stripping in Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  Johnson, 386 B.R. 
at 176-77.  
 We therefore agree with the majority of courts that 
Dewsnup‟s holding should not be imported into Chapter 11 
cases.  That this particular plan of reorganization provides for 
Debtors to develop and sell all of the lots does not alter our 
conclusion, because that is Debtors‟ business.  As appealing 
as it might be to apply the Dewsnup Court‟s holding to the 
“sale” context here, it simply does not fit.  Debtors‟ collateral 
is not being sold in a Chapter 7 liquidation.  There is neither 
foreclosure nor loss of opportunity to “credit bid,” which 
seem to have animated the Court‟s reasoning in Dewsnup.  
Unlike Chapter 7 liquidations, Chapter 11 reorganizations call 
for the creditor to receive payments equal to the value of its 
interest in the collateral over time.  See In re Bowen, 174 B.R. 
840, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (“Unlike the creditor in 
Dewsnup, creditors in reorganization cases receive something 
in exchange for the voiding of their liens: payment 
obligations under a plan of reorganization.”).  Thus, we find 
no impermissible stripping of the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
liens. 
 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court correctly found 
that the fair market value of the Project was less than the 
secured claim of the Bank Lenders, and did not violate 
Dewsnup, or any other principle of bankruptcy law, by 
adjudging the Cornerstone Investors‟ claims wholly 
unsecured.   
 
D.  Burden of Proving the Project’s Value 
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 Having now disposed of the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
principal arguments for why the Project‟s fair market value as 
of confirmation cannot control here, we return to the burden 
of proof.  To reiterate, when a party moves for a bankruptcy 
court to value secured claims pursuant to § 506(a), a burden-
shifting framework will govern.  Application of the 
framework here demonstrates that the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
appeal must fail.  
 The Committee filed the motion seeking to have the 
Cornerstone Investors‟ claims deemed wholly unsecured, and 
it was therefore obligated to present evidence that the 
Project‟s fair market value, together with the value of other 
collateral held by Debtors, was less than the Bank Lenders‟ 
secured claim.  Its submission of an appraisal previously 
accepted as evidence of the Project‟s value at a cash collateral 
hearing, as adjusted, satisfied the Committee‟s burden.  The 
veteran appraiser it enlisted used well-accepted techniques of 
real estate appraisal to calculate the Project‟s fair market 
value.  That the appraiser did so in light of the property‟s 
“proposed disposition or use” is clear from its acceptance of 
results derived from the “Developer‟s Approach,” an income 
capitalization “method of estimating land value when 
subdivision and development are the highest and best use of 
the parcel of land being appraised.”  Dictionary of Real Estate 
Appraisal (4th ed.) 279-80.  That approach most “accurately 
considered the time and expenses” that would be incurred by 
the Debtors in developing the property.  The Bankruptcy 
Court, therefore, did not err by accepting the appraiser‟s 
calculation of the Project‟s fair market value, namely, 
$9,543,396.23 after adjustment. 
 On appeal, the Cornerstone Investors attempt to chip 
away at the appraisal, contending that the appraiser‟s 
25 
 
methodology was flawed in certain respects.  However, the 
Cornerstone Investors leveled no such challenges before the 
Bankruptcy Court.  At the hearing on the Committee‟s 
motion, they conceded that the appraisal accurately calculated 
the Project‟s fair market value and urged only that the fair 
market value should not control.  Even assuming, however, 
that their failure to challenge the accuracy of the appraisal‟s 
fair market value determination did not waive the contention 
on appeal, the Cornerstone Investors‟ arguments still fail to 
demonstrate any error by the Bankruptcy Court.   
 The purported missteps by the appraiser to which they 
point do not undermine the appraisal‟s suitability to satisfy 
the Committee‟s initial burden.  First, the Cornerstone 
Investors suggest that the appraiser improperly applied 
discounts “to attract a buyer” because the plan did not 
contemplate sale to a single developer.  Those discounts, 
however, merely accounted for the risks and uncertainty 
inherent in the build-out in which Debtors were engaged.  In 
other words, they were necessary to establish the Project‟s 
present fair market value.  Second, the Cornerstone Investors 
urge that the appraisal was too stale to be acceptable, having 
been completed over a year before the plan‟s confirmation.  
However, through stipulations of fact presented to the 
Bankruptcy Court, the fair market value of the Project was 
reduced to account for sales of homes that occurred between 
the date of appraisal and the date of confirmation.  Although 
the adjustment did not account for potential shifts in land 
value or the residential home market that may have occurred 
during that period, the Cornerstone Investors offered no 
evidence of any such changes.  The Bankruptcy Court, 
therefore, did not err by adopting the adjusted appraisal value 
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of $9,543,396.23 as a fair reflection of the Project‟s worth as 
of the date on which the plan was confirmed.  
 Under a burden-shifting framework, the Cornerstone 
Investors had the ultimate burden of persuading the 
Bankruptcy Court that the appraisal undervalued the Project 
and that the Project was instead worth enough to secure their 
claims under § 506(a).  At the hearing on the Committee‟s 
motion, the Cornerstone Investors, however, expressly 
declined to have “an appraiser . . . come in and say that either 
[the Committee‟s] appraisal was wrong or that we had a 
higher . . . fair market value.”  Instead, they relied upon the 
plan budget as providing the proper valuation.  The 
Bankruptcy Court and District Court properly held that the 
budget was not a valuation, but, rather, a projection and 
refused the Cornerstone Investors‟ invitation to use a wait-
and-see approach.  The Cornerstone Investors thus failed to 
satisfy their burden.   
 Thus, the Bankruptcy Court properly accepted the 
valuation put forth by the Committee because it satisfied the 
Committee‟s burden of overcoming the presumed validity and 
amount of the Cornerstone Investors‟ secured claims.  The 
Cornerstone Investors, by contrast, did not satisfy their 
burden of proving that their secured claims were worth more 
than the Committee‟s valuation indicated.  Accordingly, the 
Bankruptcy Court did not clearly err by concluding that, in 
total, the collateral securing the secured debt was worth 
$11,165,477.15 and that therefore the Cornerstone Investors‟ 
claims were unsecured.   
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IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s determination that the secured claims of 
the Cornerstone Investors should be valued at zero.  Pursuant 
to Debtors‟ plan of reorganization, then, they are to be treated 
as members of Class 5, unsecured claimants. 
